Introduction to TrustedBSD Audit + OpenBSM



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Introduction

- · What is TrustedBSD?
- · What is event auditing?
- · CC + CAPP evaluation requirements
- · The BSM audit format
- · Kernel components
- MAC-Audit integration
- · User space components
- Status and Availability



TrustedBSD Project

- Trusted system extensions to FreeBSD
 - Announced April, 2000
- Security Infrastructure
 - OpenPAM
 - UFS2, Extended Attributes (EAs)
 - Kernel access control centralization
- Security Functionality
 - Access Control Lists (ACLs)
 - Extensible kernel access control (MAC Framework)
 - Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
 - Event Auditing, OpenBSM



What is event auditing?

- Non-bypassable audit log describing security relevant events
- Security-relevant events
 - Controlled operations
 - Authentication related events
 - Security management events
- Appropriate for many uses
 - Post-mortem
 - Intrusion detection
 - Monitoring
- Typically, variable granularity: selection



Common Criteria and Audit

- Audit is mandated by common OS security evaluations and standards
 - CC Common Criteria
 - CAPP Common Access Protection Profile
 - EAL Evaluation Assurance Level
 - A variety of other more specific requirements
- CAPP identifies functional requirements
 - Audit will provide comprehensive logging of security events defined to be relevant to CAPP
 - Typically security events identified as part of evaluation process
 - Reliability and robustness requirements also key

Excerpt of CAPP Requirements Table

CAPP Requirements Table

CAPP Category		Requirement	Description
5.1.1.1	FAU_GEN.1	Audit Data Generation	The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the auditable events listed in column "Event" of Table 1 (Auditable Events). This includes all auditable events for the basic level of audit, except FIA_UID.1's user identity during failures.
5.1.1.2	FAU_GEN.1	Audit Data Generation	The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information: (a) Data and time of the event, type of the event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; (b) additional information specified in Table 1.
5.1.2.1	FAU_GEN.2	User Identity Association	The TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
5.1.3.1	FAU_SAR.1	Audit Review	The TSF shall provide authorized administrators with the capability to read all audit information from the audit records.
5.1.3.2	FAU_SAR.1	Audit Review	The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the information.
5.1.4.1	FAU_SAR.2	Restricted Audit Review	The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, excet those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
5.1.5	FAU_SAR.3	Selectable Audit Review	The TSF shall provide the ability to perform selection of audit data based on the following attributes: (a) user identity, (b) additional attributes



Auditing Basics

- Records describe subject action on object
 - Subjects are either authenticated or nonattributable
- Kernel events are mostly system calls
 - Vast majority relate to Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
 - Wherever an access control decision is made, an audit record may be cut
- User space programs also submit records
 If appropriately privileged to write to audit log
- Kernel writes to one active log at a time



Darwin Audit

Darwin CAPP Audit

- McAfee Research under contract to Apple, Inc.
- In support of Mac OS X CAPP evaluation
- Open Source implementation of
 - Darwin kernel event auditing
 - Darwin user space event auditing
 - Sun's Basic Security Module (BSM) file format and APIs
 - Various Darwin packages, including xnu, bsm, ...
- Under a combination of APSLv2, BSD licenses



FreeBSD Audit

- TrustedBSD Project has ported Darwin Audit to FreeBSD 6.x
 - Currently in a development branch
 - Initial merge anticipated in next few weeks
 - FreeBSD 6.0 (experimental feature)
 - FreeBSD 6.1 (production feature)
- OpenBSM
 - Extraction, cleanup, enhancement of BSM include files and libraries
 - Intended to be vendor import for Darwin BSM
 - Portable to other platforms including Linux, Solaris, *BSD



BSM – Basic Security Module

- Sun's Basic Security Module (BSM)
 - In Solaris, kernel components, etc.
 - De facto audit API and file format standard
- Where possible, adopted API and file format
 - Some extensions for Darwin events not present in Solaris (etc)
- Permit reuse of applications, tools, docs
 For example, the BSM code in OpenSSH
- BSM defines a token-oriented record stream
 - Extensible, easily parseable, flexible
 - Consists of tokens and sets of tokens (records)



Audit File Stream Format

- Audit file streams consist of
 - Audit file identifier token
 - Stream of audit event records
 - Audit file identifier token
- This permits logs to be combined while maintaining log boundaries
 - Files may be concatenated
 - Files may be streamed
- Record consists of
 - Series of typed tokens describing an event



Audit Record

- Audit records consist of a series of tokens
 - All records contain header, subject, return, trailer
 - Additional tokens of various types contain eventspecific arguments
 - Ie., path names, file attributes, signal numbers, etc.





Audit Records

- Header token contains event type, timestamp, total length of record, etc.:
 - header,98,1,open(2) write,creat,trunc,0,Fri Jul 9 21:43:59 2004, + 15 msec
- Subject token contains user IDs, invariant audit ID, PID, session ID, terminal info:
 - subject,audit,root,audit,wsalamon,audit,752,751,67108866 ,0.0.0.0
- Return token contains system call success/failure and return value:
 - return, success, 3
- Two object tokens for a file in same record:
 - path,/private/var/run/utmp
 - attribute,100644,root,daemon,234881029,0,0



Audit Selection

- CAPP (and practicality) require the ability to select audit records
 - Must be able to audit all security-relevant events
 - Doesn't mean you (end-user) want to
- TrustedBSD Audit follows Solaris model
 - Pre-selection occurs early in system call to decide if a record may be required
 - Post-selection occurs at the end of the system call to decide if record was required
- Event masks are associated with each process, evaluated twice for each event
- Reduction tools also available



Audit Events & Classes

- Kernel audit events are associated with system calls
- Audit classes are used to manage classes of related audit events
- Events are mapped to 1..n classes
 - Mapping is configured by control files
 - Loaded into kernel by audit daemon
 - Event classes include "file read", "file write", ...,
 "network", ... "System V IPC", ... "exec", ...
- Processes have associated class masks for success and failure



Audit Components

- Kernel components
 - Audit system calls, event management, logging, etc.
- Audit daemon
 - Configures audit system parameters, manage audit log rotation, send warnings
- BSM library
 - APIs for creating and parsing audit records
- Tools to display, reduce the audit log
- Modifications to login, passwd, etc, to audit user space events of interest



FreeBSD Kernel Changes

- Imported Darwin 7.x kernel audit code
 Mach portions removed
- Modified syscall.master files to include audit event associated with system call
- System calls instrumented to collect argument information
- Use special file instead of Mach messages to communicate with user space audit daemon



Kernel Flow Diagram





Audit Worker Kernel Task





Audit Record Generation

- On system call entry, if pre-selection succeeds, kernel audit record is allocated on thread
 - Preselection based on audit masks associated with the process and class of event
- System call stores parameters, object info into kernel audit record
- On system call exit, post-selection decides whether to commit audit record
 - Based on result of call (success/failure) and process selection mask



Audit Record Generation cont.

- Checks made, triggers sent if:
 - Filesystem free space falls below configured limit
 - Filesystem full
 - Audit log size over configurable maximum
- Kernel audit records converted to BSM format before writing
- Tokens are generated for the audit record based on type of record
- Header, subject, and trailer tokens added
- Audit record written



MAC/Audit Integration

- The Audit system will pull subject/object labels from the policies when storing other subject/object information for auditing
 - A new interface in the MAC framework for policies to return audit-specific labels
 - Policies can also push ancillary data to the Audit system for inclusion in the currently audited system call using mac_audit_text()
- Audit information is placed in text tokens within the audit record



Audit Daemon

- Audit daemon loads the event->class mapping into kernel on startup
- Sets audit configuration parameters in kernel
- Manages audit start, suspension, and termination
- Is also responsible for audit log rotation and generating warnings
- Receives triggers from the kernel via the dev/audit special file



BSM Library

- BSM library ported with minimal changes
- Provides an API for generating BSM tokens and audit records
 - That can then be included in the audit trail via the audit() system call
- API for parsing an audit trail and presenting the information in human-readable form
- The OpenBSM project has been created to centralize changes to BSM library
- www.openbsm.org



Audit Tools

- The audit log can be examined by using tools ported from Darwin:
 - auditreduce: Select records from audit log based on user ID, date, event, etc.
 - praudit: Present audit records in humanreadable form

Example:

- auditreduce -m AUE_OPEN_WC
 /var/audit/20040710003835.20040710014658 | praudit
- Should be compatible with existing BSM tools



Cool OpenBSM Logo by Jennifer Dodd





Status and Availability

- Most of the core kernel components are in a TrustedBSD branch
- BSM library and audit reduction tools ported
- Audit daemon ported
- Several system calls audited
- Investigate defining new audit tokens for MAC auditing needs
- First public drop of OpenBSM available in the next few days
 - http://www.OpenBSM.org/
 - http://www.TrustedBSD.org/



Future Directions

- Further MAC/Audit integration
- Complete system call coverage
- Complete login/userland audit events
- Remove interim kernel audit record and use BSM token format throughout
- Performance analysis
- Test, test, test
- Produce OpenBSM 1.0 release
- Merge to FreeBSD CVS

